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I. Introduction
In 1963, Nobel Prize winning geneticist Joshua Lederberg
predicted that medical advances would impose "intolerable
economic pressures on transplant sources. ' 2 His prophetic
statement has become more undeniably true as current altruistic
methods for organ donation have failed to meet organ demand for
more than thirty years. 3 As a result of these failed organ
procurement methods, along with moral and legal barriers to other
procurement methods, thousands of people die each year from the
organ supply failure.4 The lost lives and recent technological
advances surrounding organ transplantation are leading to a
reconsideration of alternatives to altruistic donation as the most
effective means of organ procurement.
5
Advancing medical technology is a central consideration in
the discussion because human ingenuity has created immeasurable
lifesaving value in organs that was not previously possible.6 This
technology-driven value increase has contributed to a developing
tension between societal and individual rights over human organs
and other valuable bodily derivatives. 7 At the center of this tension
' J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2004. The author
would like to thank professors Gail Agrawal, Myra Collins, and Mia Doron for
their valuable editorial assistance and advice. All errors and omissions are the
sole responsibility of the author.
2 RUSSEL SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 182 (1981).
3 Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcom, To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic
Incentives for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 213, 227 (200 1)
[hereinafter Harris I].
4id.
5 Id. at 213-15.
6 See id.
7 See id at 224-32.
is the battle to create some form of market for human organs.8
Throughout this paper, "market" will be used in its broadest sense,
exchanging some form of valuable consideration for a human
organ. 9 Creating or not creating such a market will necessarily
involve judgments about what weight should be given to the claims
of society and those of the individual over organs as property.' 0
This article discusses the possibility of creating an organ market
that respects individual autonomy, prevents exploitation,
acknowledges the sanctity of human life, and increases the supply
of human organs. Such a market may save thousands of lives each
year. 11
This paper surveys the medical, legal, and policy
considerations that surround a market in human organs.' 2 Each of
these areas is important for a complete discussion and
understanding of the topic.' 3 The paper begins by discussing the
organ shortage problem and proceeds to discuss the medical
technology driving the moral choice toward a market in human
organs. There also is a discussion of the relevant case law and
statutory law surrounding the body as property. Finally, the paper
concludes with a policy level discussion of organ markets.
8 Id. The word "market" is used generally to refer to some system of exchange
that will render a benefit to the organ donor. This benefit does not have to be a
monetary benefit and does not have to be given directly during life. Id. Many
possible types of markets are discussed later in this article.
9I.
10 Id.
" See id. at 227-33. This article acknowledges that transplant is a heroic
medical effort, made in the last stages of many diseases. An economic analysis
of lifesaving procedures and preventive methods would probably indicate that
healthcare dollars may be more effectively spent in early discovery and
treatment of diseases such as hepatitis and diabetes so that patients would not
advance far enough to need a transplant cure.
12 id.
'3 See Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's
Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation
System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 45-111 (1995).
N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 4
A MARKET IN HUMAN ORGANS
A. The Problem
As of January 18, 2003, there were eighty thousand people
waiting for an organ donation; a name is added to that list every
thirteen minutes. 14 Twelve Americans die every day waiting for a
vital organ.15 These deaths are particularly troubling because the
medical technology necessary to save those lives exists and is
rapidly advancing.1 6 The consensus of the organ transplant
community is that the organ supply shortage is a major concern, if
not the greatest obstacle, to saving lives through transplantation.'
7
Donating an organ posthumously, or while living, is a
difficult choice for many. 18 The decision to donate an or an has
complex religious, medical, and financial considerations. 9 Given
14 United Network for Organ Sharing, 2002 Annual Report of the U.S. Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network and the Scientific Registry of
Transplant Recipients: Transplant Data 1992-2001, Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network, at http://www.optn.org/data/annualReport.asp (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) [hereinafter Report]; United Network for Organ Sharing,
Newsroom Fact Sheets, at http://www.unos.org/inTheNews/factSheets.asp (last
visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) [hereinafter UNOS Fact Sheet].
15 Harris I, supra note 3, at 213.
16 DAVID PRICE, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
23 (2000); LINDA S. SHER & LEONARD MAKOWKA, INTRA-ABDOMINAL ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 2000 8 (1994); David M. Harlan and Allan D. Kirk, The
Future of Organ and Tissue Transplantation: Can T-Cell Costimulatory
Pathway Modifiers Revolutionize the Prevention of Graft Rejection?, 282 JAMA
1076, 1076 (1999); Laura A. Siminoff & Matthew Leonard, Financial
Incentives: Alternatives to the Altruistic Model of Organ Donation, 9 J.
TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 250, 250 (1999).
17 Frederick L. Grover et al., The Past, Present, and Future of Lung
Transplantation, 173 AM. J. SURGERY 524, 532 (1997); Markus Weber et al.,
Organ Transplantation in the Twenty-First Century, 25 UROLOGIC CLINICS N.
AM. 51,58 (1998).
18 ARTHUR L. CAPLAN & DANIEL H. COELHO, THE ETHICS OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS 41-47 (1998); ROBERT M. VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS
1-20 (2000).
19 Id
SPRING 2003]
420 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 4
the weight of the decision, it is easy to sympathize with the vast
majority of people who decide not to donate their organs. 20
The organ shortage is not a new problem.21 A shortage has
existed as long as there has been successful transplant technology,
and this shortage has increased every year.22 The medical
profession has tried to work around the organ shortage for
decades.23 The transplant community has attempted to use
artificial organs, animal organs, and wholly new organs engineered
from basic materials.24 These methods have met with limited
success, with some new solutions, such as growing new organs in
vitro, still lingering in the realm of science fiction. 5 Human organ
donation and transplantation remain the most successful and viable
methods for the majority of people needing organs.26
II. The Medicine of Transplantation
A. History of Human Organ Transplantation
Human organ transplantation is a relatively new
technology.27 Although surgery is thousands of years old, it has
20 Id. There were only 134,000 donors recorded by JNOS between 1988 and
2002. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, National Data
(Statistics based on data as of March 6, 2003.), at
http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). This number is
particularly low when compared with the total population of the country. The
number, however large, must also be considered against the background that
only certain types of deaths, such as stroke and motor vehicle accidents qualify
as organ donors.
21 Siminoff& Leonard, supra note 16, at 252.22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Weber et al., supra note 17, at 55-58.
25 Paul S. Malchesky, Artificial Organs and Vanashing Boundaries, 25
ARTIFICIAL ORGANS 75, 75-79 (2001).
26 TRANSPLANTATION SURGERY 17-18 (Nadey S. Hakim & Gabriel M.
Danovitch eds., 2001) [hereinafter Hakim I]. Organs and tissues that can be
donated include: heart, kidneys, lungs, pancreas, liver, intestines, corneas, skin,
tendons, bone, and heart valves. UNOS Fact Sheet, supra note 14.
27 Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51.
only been within the past fifty years that the medical community
has been able to transplant an organ from one human to another
with any measure of success. 28 By comparison, the modem
computer pre-dates the first human transplant by more than a
decade, as does atomic weaponry, the Porsche, and antibiotics.29
The first kidney was transplanted in 1951, the first lung in 1963,
the first intestine in 1964, the first liver in 1965, the first pancreas
in 1966, and the first heart in 1967.30
Transplant technology is rapidly advancing because of its
youth as a medical discipline and the accelerated pace of scientific
discovery in our age. 31 As a society, policy decisions and value
judgments were made about the appropriate boundaries of
transplant technology near its inception, judgments that no longer
hold true given technological advancement. 32 Several
contemporaneous factors informed those original policy decisions
and value judgments. For example, the wait for donor organs
initially was not as long as it is today, the need was not as great,
and the life saving power of transplantation was more mythic than
real.33 In the early days of transplantation, some religious and
28 Id. It should also be noted that only within the past thirty years has organ
transplantation been considered safe and widely used. There are religious,
historical, and mythic examples of human transplantation, however, that date
back many centuries. For example, Cosmas and Damian, Christian Arab saints
martyred in 300 A.D., were reputed to have replaced the diseased leg of a sexton
with that of a Moor who had died several days earlier. Physicians in ancient
India could repair mutilated noses using other tissues from the donor. This
process was improved upon during the sixteenth century in Europe and used by
the plastic surgeon Gaspare Tagliacozzi, among others. Hakim I, supra note 26,
at 1.
29 THE TIMETABLES OF HISTORY 519-529 (Bernard Grun ed., Simon & Shuster
3rd ed. 1991) (1946).30 INTRODUCTION TO ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 4-10 (Nadey S. Hakim ed.)
(1997) [hereinafter Hakim II]; David E. R. Sutherland, Lessons Learned From
More Than 1,000 Pancreas Transplants at a Single Institution, 233 ANNALS
SURGERY 463, 464 (2001); PRICE, supra note 16, at 3; Grover et al., supra note
17, at 523.
31 See Weber, supra note 17, at 51-58.
32 Harris I, supra note 3, at 227-28. These policy decisions and value judgments
include a broad prohibition against valuable consideration in exchange for
organs, thus prohibiting virtually any type of organ market. Id.
33 Id.
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ethnic communities resisted the idea of human organ
transplantation in any form. 34 Currently, however, most people
have accepted transplantation as an important life saving
technology and organ donation as an important societal goal.35
The remaining questions revolve around what type of procurement
and distribution methods should be encouraged and the related
property claims of society, and of the individual, implicit in these
procurement and distribution methods.
This is a pivotal point in the history of transplantation.
People must now reconsider many of the moral and legal aspects
of organ transplantation due to the increasing demand for organs
coupled with an unmatched supply. The need for donors, with
scientific advances and measures of transplant success, is growing
daily. 36 Technologically advanced societies are nearing the point,
if they have not already passed it, where legislative judgments
prohibiting a market in human organs have restricted the organ
supply to such a degree that the current restrictive position appears
less ethically defensible, if not morally culpable, as thousands die
each year.
B. Current State of Transplantation
Transplantation is safer and more successful than ever
before. 37 One-year survival rates for most organ transplants are
34 VEATCH, supra note 18, at 19-20. The religions that have opposed organ
transplant include Shintoism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and some Native American
religions. Generally, these religions are suspicious of the value of a technology
that merely extends humans' biological existence in this world. Id.
35 PRICE, supra note 16, at 23; SHER & MAKOWKA supra note 16, at 8.
Currently, all major world religions support the idea of organ transplantation in
some form as a benevolent, life saving measure. See TransWeb.org, Does My
Religion Approve of Organ Donation?, at
http://www.transweb.org/qa/qa don/religion.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
36 See Harris I, supra note 3, at 213-15; see also Weber et al., supra note 17, at
51.
37 This is not to say that transplantation is entirely safe. Adult-to-adult right lobe
liver transplants, among the most dangerous of common transplants, have a 0.2
percent mortality rate, 14 percent of donors have "serious complications," and
8.5 percent of donors require re-hospitalization. Robert S. Brown et al., A
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nearing ninety percent and five-year survival rates are now greater
than seventy percent. 38 Transplanting organs and living with a
transplanted organ now border on being medically routine given
the current success of transplantation, but this was not always so.
39
Technical successes with organ transplantation have been largely
attributable to technological advances in equipment, advances in
surgical technique, and, primarily, the immunological benefits
realized by anti-rejection drug regimens.4 °
First, transplant technology has advanced rapidly with the
assistance of some key equipment developments. The first piece
of equipment that proved essential for advances in transplant
technology was the heart-lung machine.4 1 First used in 1953, it
allows surgeons to artificially pump and oxygenate blood during a
surgical procedure.42 The ability to pump and oxygenate blood is
particularly important where the transplanted organ is either the
heart or lungs.43 This machine is also, in part, the intellectual
ancestor of both the modem Left Ventricular Assist Device
("LVAD") and the internal artificial heart.44 Second, the
equipment developed by anesthesiology for monitoring transplant
patients and delivering drugs has greatly improved in the last fifty
years.45 Anesthesiologists are now able to maintain patients in
Survey of Liver Transplantation from Living Adult Donors in the United States,
348 NEw ENG. J. MED. 818, 818-25 (2003). This can be compared with kidney
transplantation, which is safer and more widely practiced. Kidney
transplantation has fewer complications and a donor mortality rate of 0.03
percent. Owen Surman, The Ethics of Partial-Liver Donation, 346 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1038, 1038 (2002).
38 See Grover et al., supra note 17, at 523; see also, Weber et al., supra note 17,
at 51; James C. Spann & Clifford Van Meter, Cardiac Transplantation, 78
CARDIOTHORACIC VASCULAR SURGERY 679, 679 (1998).
39 PRICE, supra note 16, at 23; SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 8.
40 See Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51-58.
41 See W. BRUCE FYE, AMERICAN CARDIOLOGY THE HISTORY OF A SPECIALTY
AND ITS COLLEGE 167-68 (1996).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 D. Glenn Pennington et al., Cardiac Assist Devices, 78 CARDIOTHORACIC
VASCULAR SURGERY 691, 691-92 (1998).
45 See Hakim 1, supra note 26, at 355-71. There are also pre-, intra-, and post-
operative anesthesia management protocols specific to each type of organ
SPRING 2003]
more physiologically controlled states for longer than was
previously possible.46
In the realm of surgical technique, there is no substitute for
practice. In the early 1900's, Nobel Prize winner Alexis Carrel
recognized the importance of blood vessel anastomosis 47 when
transplanting major vascularized organs in animals.48 His
methods, including using fine needles and thread, careful
dissection, controlling bleeding at both ends of a blood vessel,
exact identification of vessel layers, and sewing vessels together in
a way that everts49 the intima,50 have been used with few
modifications since 1902."'
52Carrel was also a pioneer in organ preservation. He was
one of the first to develop a physiologically balanced solution to
maintain the viability of organs much longer than was previously
possible.53 Carrel began by using a room temperature solution.54
It was not until the 1960's that Geoffrey Collins substantially
improved on Carrel's work by cooling the solution and changing
its composition to essentially what is still in use today.55
Specifically for lung transplants, Frank Veith discovered in 1979
that reattaching a lung using a shorter donor bronchial length leads
to better healing. 56 This technical modification has been called
transplant that have improved over the years. The protocols depend upon a
specialized knowledge of organ failure for each type of organ replaced and play
a significant role in the successful outcome of transplantations. Id.
46 id.
47 Anastomosis is the splicing of two hollow tubular structures together. In the
instance above it is used to describe the operative union of blood vessels.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 72 (Marjory Spraycar ed., 26th ed. 1995).
48 Hakim II, supra note 30, at 3.
49 Eversion is the process of turning outward, as with an eyelid or a foot. As
used here, it means to turn the vessel layer outward during the surgical process.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 606.
50 The intima is the inner most layer of a blood vessel. ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC
BASIS OF DISEASE 494 (Ramzi S. Cotran et. al. eds., 6th ed. 1999).
51 Hakim II, supra note 30, at 3.
52 Hakim I, supra note 26, at 13.
53 Id
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Grover et al., supra note 17, at 523.
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"the single most important detail" for successful bronchial
anastomosis.
The greatest advances in organ transplantation, however,
have probably resulted from immunologic manipulation using anti-
rejection drug regimens. 58 Advances in anti-rejection drug
regimens have proven difficult, and the benefits resulting from new
developments in this area cannot be overstated. 59 The primary
problem in the area is gaining a functional understanding of the
human immune sstem and using that understanding to develop
pharmaceuticals. 0 To be effective, pharmaceuticals must
manipulate the hypothesized immune mechanisms in a way that
prolongs organ survival.61 Without immunological intervention,
an organ recipient's body will not tolerate the organ and will reject
62it, a process termed graft rejection.
Graft rejection can be hyper acute, acute, or chronic. 63
Hyper acute rejection occurs within minutes or hours of
transplantation. 64 It may even occur as early as the completion of
the procedure. 65 Often the transplanted organ appears pale or
57 Id.; See supra text accompanying note 47 (defining anastomosis).
58 See Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51-52.
59 One of the greatest early advances in the understanding of transplant rejection
can be attributed to Sir Peter Brian Medawar, the zoologist and Nobel Prize
winner. His work described what he called "actively acquired immunity" during
the 1940's. This, along with his later work using steroids and describing
tolerance, has encouraged modem scientists to believe that the seemingly
impossible obstacle of host rejection may one day be overcome. See Hakim II,
supra note 30, at 1-19.
60 id.
61 Id
62 See Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51-52.
63 Id.
64 ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE, supra note 50, at 207-08. Hyper-
acute rejection is the type of rejection that occurred in the recent and tragic gross
error by Duke University Medical Center when its doctors transplanted young
Jesica Santillan with a heart-lung organ set of the wrong blood type. Jessica had
type 0 blood, and the donor had type A blood. These major immunological
differences cannot be overcome, and such an error is almost invariably fatal.
Jerry Adler, A Tragic Error, NEWSWEEK, (Mar. 2003), available at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/876221.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
65 ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE, supra note 50, at 207-08.
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mottled and does not regain function after the procedure. 66 The
incidence of hyper acute rejection has been reduced as
immunologic matching technology has improved, subsequently
causing better fits between the donor and recipient immune
systems.
67
Acute rejection may occur within days of the transplant or
may appear months or years later.68 It is characterized as a slower
process than hyper acute rejection, usually manifested by organ
failure with inflamed, deteriorating blood vessels within the
transplanted organ. 69 Acute rejection episodes have essentially
been conquered through the use of modem combination
immunosuppressive treatments, as discussed below.
70
Chronic graft rejection occurs through mechanisms that are
not yet fully understood. 71 It is the greatest obstacle to stable long-
term transplantation cures because it has no effective treatment.
72
Not all organ recipients encounter chronic graft rejection, but of
those organs that fail after the first year, the majority fail because
73
of chronic graft rejection. It occurs over many months or years
and affects the body of the organ itself as well as the blood vessels
running through the organ. 74 These chronic changes ultimately
result in complete organ failure.
75
A hope for overcoming chronic rejection, and the goal of
immunologic manipulation, is to induce tolerance. 76 Tolerance is
an immunologic state in which the graft is tolerated by the
recipient's immune system. 77 Importantly, if immune tolerance is
achieved, then transplanted organs have a greatly improved chance
66 Id.
67 See id. at 204-10.
68 Id. at 209.
69 Id.
70 See Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51-52.
71 ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE, supra note 50, at 209-10.
72 See Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51-52.
73 Id.
74 ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE, supra note 50, at 209-10.
75 Id.
76 See Weber et al., supra note 17, at 58.
71 STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 1819; see Weber et al.,
supra note 17, at 52-54.
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of success.78 Current pharmacologic methods alone rarely induce a
true state of tolerance, but they may induce such a state when
combined with coming advances and new transplant discoveries.79
Pharmacological advances, including the development of
anti-rejection drug regimens, have been the largest factor
contributing to the general success of organ transplants.80 The first
agent used in humans was 6-mercaptopurine. 81 Use of this new
anti-rejection regimen produced a great improvement over pre-
anti-rejection drug outcomes but was not nearly as effective as
later-developed regimens.82 In the late 1970's, a drug named
cyclosporine was introduced into the clinical community.
83
Cyclosporine has proven to be the most successful and commonly
used agent for transplants in the past twenty years.
84
Thomas Starzl is perhaps most responsible for the
widespread use and extensive understanding of cyclosporine 8 5 He
demonstrated the dramatic improvement possible in renal and
hepatic allografts8 6 with some of the most extensive studies of the
drug.87 As a testament to the drug's effectiveness, pre-
cyclosporine, one-year organ transplant survival rates were less
than forty percent. 88 Post-cyclosporine, one-year organ transplant
survival rates are now eighty percent, with an incredible seventy
percent five-year survival rate. 89 The future promises higher
success and survival rates using newer drugs, including
mycophnolate moefetil tacrolimus and rapamycin.90 These drugs
78 See Weber et al., supra note 17, at 58.
79 See id. at 51-58.
80 See id. at 51-52.81 Hakim 11, supra note 30, at 5.
82 Id.
83 Hakim 1, supra note 26, at 4-5.
84 Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51.
85 See Hakim I, supra note 26, at 5-6.
86 An allograft is a graft that is transplanted between genetically non-identical
individuals that are from the same species. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 47, at 50.
87 SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 2; Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51.
88 SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 2; Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51.
89 SHER& MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 2; Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51.
90 Weber et al., supra note 17, at 52.
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have been developed with improved immunological understanding
of and experience with anti-rejection regimes.9 1
Considering all the technological advances in transplant
medicine, equipment, drugs, and surgical techniques, the largest
obstacle currently facing transplantation is the growing organ
supply shortage.92 This problem of organ shortage cannot be
solved through better surgical techniques, equipment, or
pharmaceuticals. It is a problem requiring a political solution,
away from the hospital and the research bench.
C. Future of Transplantation
It is essential to note that organ supply and donor shortages
are driving the development of most of the emerging techniques
discussed below. If there were an available supply of organs equal
to the demand, then virtually all of the technologies discussed
below would drop in importance. Nearly all of these emerging
techniques are an attempt to make poor immunological matches
accepted longer, or create an additional supply of new organs. In
effect, they are all attempting to substitute or compensate for a
scarce supply of human organs.
The future of organ transplantation is promising given
current avenues of inquiry. Avenues of research include two major
areas: (1) technology to create new sources of donor organs; and
(2) technology to fight graft rejection.93
1. New Sources of Donor Organs
A major effort to increase the supply of organs is through
xenotransplantation. Xenotransplantation is a medical advance
91 Id.
92 See Grover et al., supra note 17, at 532; see also Weber et al., supra note 17,
at 58.
93 See generally FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT
(Julia M. Polak et. al. eds., 2002). It is interesting to note that one of the
pioneers of xenotransplantation was the Russian-born Parisian Serge Voronoff
made infamous in the early part of the twentieth century by transplanting
monkey testicles into men, believing this would stave off age-related mental and
physical deterioration. Hakim I, supra note 26, at 1.
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that would allow physicians to use animal organs to replace failing
human organs for transplant purposes.94 The problems with this
approach include increased graft rejection, possible cross-species
disease transfer, and moral objections by some groups. 9
5
Unaltered animal organs are so different from human organs that
hyper acute rejection usually occurs when animal organs are used
for transplants. 96 In an effort to overcome this problem, transgenic
animals have been developed. 97 Transgenic animals are
genetically altered animals that express special proteins due to
their genetic alteration that allow them to be more compatible with
human immune systems. 98 Mechanistically, they express proteins
that interrupt the immunologic graft rejection cascade, which is a
series of biochemical reactions, by blocking or accelerating the
decay of important protein factors necessary for the rejection
9' FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note 93,
at 217-30; Weber et al., supra note 17, at 55-56.
95 Among the groups that are alarmed by xenotransplantation are animal rights
activists who believe that it is unethical to take an animal's life and organs so
that a human might live. Other groups worried include those that fear the
possibility of animal to human (cross-species) disease transmission. One of the
first and most publicized transplants was that of Baby Fae in 1984. The baby
was born with a fatal heart condition on October 12, 1984. A baboon heart was
transplanted into the baby because compatible infant hearts are almost never
available. Baby Fae lived until November 15, 1984, and the final cause of death
remains in dispute because initial testing did not show cellular evidence of
rejection. See FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT,
supra note 93, at 217-30; see also VEATCH, supra note 18, at 259-71.
96 Weber et al., supra note 17, at 55-56.
97 See FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note
93, at 217-30; SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 7; Weber et al., supra note
17, at 57-58. The most commonly discussed transgenic species is the pig. Pigs
are superior to primates because they are more variable in size, are readily
available, have very few human pathogens, are easily genetically engineered,
and have frequent litters. Additionally, the phylogenetic distance between
humans and pigs amplified by the long established agricultural use of pigs make
them far less susceptible to the ethical problems encountered when engineering
primates for transplantation. See Hakim I, supra note 26, at 428-30.
98 See FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note
93, at 217-230; SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 7; Weber et al., supra note
17, at 57-58.
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reaction. 99 Transgenic animals should eventually be able to allow
organ recipients to completely resist the graft rejection process and
develop a type of tolerance toward the new organ.' 0 However, the
theoretical advances described above are still far from reality.'1
0
Given the difficulty involved in xenografts, researchers have also
considered using artificial devices to replace human organs. 
02
Artificial organs have replaced human organs on a limited
basis. 10 3 Surgeons have successfully transplanted artificial hearts
and kidneys. 104 Artificial livers, artificial muscles, as well as an
artificial pancreas capable of slowly releasing insulin, are currently
being developed. 10 5 The artificial heart and related devices have
proven to be the most successful of all artificial organs.' 06 One
type of heart-related artificial device is the Left Ventricular Assist
Device ("LVAD").10 7 This device is mechanical, with a significant
portion of the device placed outside the body.'0 8 It assists the
heart's most powerful chamber, the left ventricle, by helping pump
oxygenated blood to the body.l°9 Devices like the LVAD are often
called "bridging devices" because they allow patients with failing
hearts to extend the amount of time that they can wait for a
transplantable organ.' One of the greatest artificial organ
99 See FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note
93, at 217-230; SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 7; Weber et al., supra note
17, at 57-58.
1oo See FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note93, at 217-230; SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 7; Weber et al., supra note
17, at 57-58.
1o1 See FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note
93, at 217-230; SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 7; Weber et al., supra note
17, at 57-58.
'0' See FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note
93, at 141-42.
103 Id.
104 See id at 141-66.
105 See PRICE, supra note 16, at 7.
106 Pennington et al., supra note 44, at 691-95 (1998); see also Spann & Van
Meter, supra note 38, at 679-82.
107 Spann & Van Meter, supra note 38, at 679-82.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See PRICE, supra note 16, at 7.
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accomplishments to date was the installation of the Jarvik 2000
artificial heart into a ten-year old boy in Oxford, England, in
1998,'11 which allowed him to survive for five days while a donor
heart was found and successfully transplanted.'
1 12
A device that is planned to do more than merely assist the
heart is the Total Artificial Heart ("TAH")." 3 In July 2001,
surgeons placed the first entirely implantable TAH. 14 Despite
advances in artificial organs, including artificial hearts, however,they remain expensive and less effective than natural tissue. 115
Another approach suggested to overcome the organ
shortage is tissue engineering," 6 which can be thought of as abridge between the artificial and the natural.' 1 7 In some instances,
the engineered tissue contains both biological and non-biological
components." 8 Ideally, tissue engineering would mimic as closely
as possible the human body's own construction of tissues and
organs." 9 Cells naturally form into a scaffolding, or matrix.12
0
Id.
1121id
113 Abiomed is the company responsible for the first totally implantable artificial
heart. Its newest hearts have no moving parts and are about the size of a
grapefruit, made of titanium and plastic, and weigh only two pounds. The heart
is also so quiet that people present in the same room report being unable to hear
its pumping. Furthermore, it is entirely implanted inside the body with an
external coil from a battery pack worn around the waste that provides power
through the skin. There is also an internal power supply that lasts thirty minutes
in case of emergencies. Other advances that exist for artificial hearts include
electromagnetic fields supporting internal rotors and car chargers, so that
artificial hearts can be recharged while one drives. CHFpatients.com, Artificial
Hearts, at http://www.chfpatients.com/implants/artificialhearts.htm (updated
May 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology);
See also Emily Denham Morris, The Organ Trail: Express Versus Presumed
Consent as Paths to Blaze in Solving a Critical Shortage, 90 KY. L.J. 1125,
1125 (2002).
114 CHFpatients.com, supra note 113.
115 See Pennington et al., supra note 44, at 679-82.
116 See FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note
93, at 51-71.
117id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
SPRING 20031 A MARKET IN HUMAN ORGANS
Then, more cells grow over this matrix into tissues and organs.121
The goal of tissue engineering is to recreate the natural biological
process in the laboratory. 122 Researchers are currently attempting
to use stem cells or other undifferentiated cells on natural and
artificial matrixes with the goal of creating tissues and, eventually,
organs. 123 Although researchers are currently able to form small
sections of bone, skin, and simple organs, this approach has met
with only limited success. 
124
Finally, organ preservation methods are also currently the
subject of much research and are considered an effective way to
increase the donor pool by increasing the time an organ can travel
to a recipient. 125 For example, kidneys are currently able to
survive outside the body for forty-eight hours, while a heart is
viable for about six hours. 126 Each organ type also has specific
handling instructions and types of solutions used to extend its
"shelf life. ' 127 New work with lower temperature preservation
methods and new chemical solutions should extend the time organs
are available for donation. 128 This will have the effect of extending
the geographic area where organ donors may be located,
potentially increasing the number of organs for transplantation.'
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 10-30; see also FUTURE
STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note 93, at 27-46.
This does not directly increase the donor pool by providing more organs, but it
has the effect of increasing the donor pool by increasing the range that organs
can travel to a recipient. Some organs that would previously go unused are now
able to be matched with recipients at distances that were not previously
achievable. The result is that as organ preservation techniques improve, more
organs are used and more patients receive organs. This technology can be
viewed as having an "effective" increase on the donor organ pool. See id.
126 SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 10-30; FUTURE STRATEGIES FOR
TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note 93, at 27.
127 See Hakim I, supra note 26, at 265-95.
128 See SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 10-30; see also FUTURE
STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note 93, at 27-46.
129 ,,
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2. Pharmaceutical Alternatives for Fighting Graft
Rejection
Researchers are also actively investigating alternatives to
pharmaceutical mechanisms to manipulate the immune system,
halt rejection, and induce tolerance. 130 To date, these methods
have been less successful than pharmaceutical manipulation, but
they maintain their importance because they are areas with great
potential benefit for organ transplantation. 131 Additionally, this
research is driven by the organ shortage and societal pressures to
match organs with donors that are far less than immunologically
ideal, including the very immunologically non-ideal organs
provided by xenotransplantation.132 These alternatives generally
center on the manipulation of genes and gene products.'
33
The first alternative to pharmaceutical manipulation is
direct gene therapy. 134 The idea behind gene therapy is locating a
gene that causes cells to produce a protein of interest and, then,
finding a way to incorporate that gene into a target cell that would
benefit from expressing that protein.' 35 This approach could be
used to alter the immune response to foreign organs and, perhaps,
to halt the rejection process. 136 The goal of gene therapy is to
introduce genes into the recipient's immune system that fool it into
believing that the transplanted organ is not foreign tissue. 137 As an
alternative, genes may also be introduced into the donor organ that
130 Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51-58. This refers to the methods discussed in
this section of the paper as pharmaceutical "alternatives" because they are being
researched as a way to control the immune system that does not directly involve
the administration of drugs. In practice, however, they will almost certainly be
employed with pharmaceutical regimens during actual clinical practice, at least
at the early stages of their development. Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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produce factors blocking or accelerating the destruction of
important signaling factors known as cytokines.
138
As another alternative to pharmaceutical manipulation, it
may also be possible to blend the donor and recipient immune
systems through methods such as the transplantation of bone
marrow along with the donor organ.' 39 Bone marrow produces and
trains some of the immune cells so that they do not recognize the
foreign identity of an organ.'1 40 Ideally, the donor and recipient
immune systems can find a way to function together in harmony,
sparing the donor organ.'n1 This blending of immune systems is
called chimerism and, if successful, will be an important step
toward achieving tolerance. 142
138 Cytokines are intercellular signaling molecules that are essential to the
immune system. Science has only discovered a fraction of these communication
molecules that are important to the rejection process. Future research is aimed
at discovering more of these molecules, their function, and ways to manipulate
them to induce tolerance and halt rejection. Blocking important cytokines and
accelerating their destruction is a similar theoretical mechanism to some of those
employed in transgenic animals.
A related technology involves the use of a type of molecule called a
monoclonal antibody. Monoclonal antibodies are specifically engineered
proteins that are constructed to attack one target specifically. If injected into a
person with a donated organ, these monoclonal antibodies could be engineered
to destroy cytokines and other factors important to the rejection process.
Blocking cytokines by any mechanism and using monoclonal antibodies to
affect rejection are all methods that are still in initial experimental stages. See
SHER & MAKOWKA, supra note 16, at 4-5.
139 Bimalangshu Dey et al., Outcomes of Recipients of Both Bone Marrow and
Solid Organ Transplants, 77 MEDICINE 355, 355-66 (1998); Thomas E. Starzl et
al., Chimerism and Xenotransplantation, 79 SURGICAL CLINICS N. AM. 191,
191-201 (1999).
140 Dey et al., supra note 139, at 355-66; Starzl et al., supra note 139, at 191-
201.
14' Dey et al., supra note 139, at 355-66; Starzl et al., supra note 139, at 191-
201.
142 Id. The word chimerism comes from the mythological beast of Lycia, the
Chimera. It was part lion, goat, and dragon. In addition, the beast spawned the
Sphinx and the Nemean Lion. It was eventually slain by Bellerophon and has
found its way into both English and medical terminology as a reference to
something patched together from incongruous sources. MICHAEL MACRONE, BY
JOVE! BRUSH UP YOUR MYTHOLOGY 148-49 (1992).
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Importantly, none of the organ substitute technologies,
even working in concert with pharmacological regimes, have
advanced far enough to extend life even a year without a
transplant. 143 Many of the organ substitute advances above are not
yet developed to the extent that they are widely used on humans,
putting them squarely in the realm of science fiction. 144 The hope
of overcoming the donor shortage embodied in the quest for organ
substitutes and pharmacological advances above could be realized
in the present by the implementation of an organ market.
However, there are multiple legal and public policy considerations
surrounding the sale of organs.
III. The Law and Public Policy of Human Organ Sale for
Transplantation
The law and public policy surrounding transplantation is an
area of great volume and complexity. 145 This section will survey
some of the most influential law and organizational policies
pertaining to the sale of human organs. On the whole, this section
will demonstrate a historical resistance to the notion of a market in
organs, with some recent shifts toward more accepting attitudes as
medical technology advances and as organ demand grows.
A. The Body as Property: Development of a Property
Interest Through Case Law
The general notion of the body as property has long been
debated. 146 Property interests in living persons have a long and
controversial history in the United States and were definitively
decided through a Civil War and a Constitutional amendment. 147
143 See Weber et al., supra note 17, at 51-58. See generally FUTURE
STRATEGIES FOR TISSUE AND ORGAN REPLACEMENT, supra note 93, at 91.
144 Id.
145 See generally Walter Block, et al., Human Organ Transplantation:
Economic & Legal Issues, 3 QUINNIPAC HEALTH L.J. 87, 87-109 (2001); see
also PRICE, supra note 16, at 1-20.
146 See Block et al., supra note 145, at 87-109; PRICE, supra note 16, at 1-20.
147 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. This amendment can be viewed as an affirmation
of individual property rights and each person's bodily autonomy.
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At common law, there was no property interest in a corpse. 148 The
clergy had ecclesiastical courts with exclusive jurisdiction over
disputes concerning corpses and where the corpses would be
interred. 149 In the seventeenth century, Lord Edward Coke, the
English judge and legal scholar, considered the property status of
the cadaver implicit in his etymological derivation of the word
cadaver, caro data vermibus, flesh given to worms, and, therefore,
the property of no one. 150 This interpretation satisfied Lord Coke
and influenced hundreds of years of common law.' 5' This
influence prevented the body, or anything derived from it, from
being treated as a good or being legally recognized as any other
type of property.152 This interpretation remained sufficient until
the nineteenth century.1
53
The 1856 case of In re Beekman Street exposed Coke's
poor Latin scholarship, and the shift toward acknowledging some
property rights in the body began.' 54 In Re Beekman Street
involved widening a well-known New York City street and
removing many corpses from a graveyard.155 When the daughter
of one of the men buried in the graveyard sought property-related
damages, the referee in the case, Samuel B. Ruggles, launched an
attack on Coke's Latin explanation of cadaver and declared that the
true derivation came from cadere, which meant "to fall.' 56
Ruggles' interpretation has been recognized as the correct
148 SCOTT, supra note 2, at 186; R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones: Post-Mortem
Markets in Human Tissue, 26 NOVA L. REv. 421, 425-26 (2002); See 3 Edward
Coke, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 203 (1644); Renihan v. Wright,
25 N.E. 822, 824 (Ind. 1890) (discussing the early English common law position
that there was no property right in a corpse and that any dispute over the
interment of a corpse must be resolved through ecclesiastical courts).
149 Renihan, 25 N.E. at 824. (discussing the early English common law position
that there was no property right in a corpse and that any dispute over the
interment of a corpse must be resolved through ecclesiastical courts).
150 SCOTT, supra note 2, at 186.
151 Id.
152 Id.
1'3 See id. at 186-87.
15 4 Id. at 187.
155 Id.
156 SCOTT, supra note 2, at 186.
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derivation, and the case marked the legal beginning of a shift
toward recognizing more robust property rights in one's body.'57
Francis Carey continued the development of a legal theory
describing the body as property in an 1885 law review article in
which he noted that, due to medical advances and the need for
human bodies as dissection material, the human corpse had
become "a thing of value, a subject of political economies, perhaps
to be bought, sold, and exchanged, and subject to the rules of
supply and demand."' 158 Carey prophetically noted the excitement
experienced by lawyers as "the human corpse rises to a dignity and
importance in the commercial world which it may not have
possessed in its lifetime," is "second only to that caused by death
itself., 59 Further the lawyer "pricks up his ears and holds the
reins of his lawful control over the heretofore useless hulk with
firmer grasp" in the hopes that someday the body will be
"appraised and executor's commissions calculated upon it!' 160
Somberly he concludes with visionary clarity, "the whole
foundation of law and custom is shaken," and it falls upon us to
answer the serious question of how it will be rebuilt.' 6 /
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have contained
urgings toward body property rights in some respects while
157 Id.; As Ruggles noted, cadaver is derived from "cadere" meaning "to fall,"
as in the fallen ruins of a city. See O.H. PEPPER, MEDICAL ETYMOLOGY 19
(1949); WILLIAM S. HAUBRICH, MEDICAL MEANINGS 34 (1997).
158 Francis King Carey, The Disposition of the Body After Death, 19 AM. L. REV.
251, 252 (1885).
A great many years ago: - before American jurisprudence
had torn the wigs and gowns from the wrinkled head and
shaking shoulders of the common law, and before common
sense had suggested any doubt as to the certainty of the
resurrection of the human body in its original flesh and blood
every man approached the gateway which is called death,
under the complete dominion of the three learned professions.
The doctor of medicine was master of his mortal body, the
doctor of law clung to his almighty dollar (whatever shape it
might then have taken), and the doctor of theology tyrannized
his immortal soul. Id. at 251.
159 Carey, supra note 158, at 251.
160 id.
161 
-[d.
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maintaining explicit exclusions of property rights in others. 162
Modem medical advances have "altered the value of the human
body, from merely a source of labor, or food for worms, to a highly
prized biological commodity."'
163
The 1978 case of McFall v. Shimp 164 is particularly useful
for considering: (1) English legal principles against property rights
in our own bodies reaching into modem times; (2) how medical
advances create new applications of these principles and new value
in the human body; and (3) the modem trend protecting bodily
autonomy against state compulsion.' 
65
In McFall, the plaintiff, Robert McFall "suffer[ed] from a
rare bone marrow disease."'166 His prognosis was poor, and his
chances of survival were slim unless he found a bone marrow
donor. 67 His cousin, David Shimp, was a possible match given
that they were closely related. 168 Shimp, however, did not want to
undergo the tests necessary to verify that he was a match.1
69
McFall sought a court order forcing his cousin to submit to the
transplant tests.' 70 McFall's argument centered on a seven-
hundred-year old English law that requires a person to give up
their bodily security to save another if it is the only means
available.' 71 The court ruled against McFall's request, denying the
162 See Charo, supra note 148, at 425-50. This has taken shape by forming
markets in blood and reproductive cells, but continuing to outlaw slavery or
selling the tissues of others without their consent. Id. This shift toward
autonomy is also implicit in such other decisions as Schloendorff where
Cardozo writes, "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body..." Schloendorffv. Soc'y
of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
163 Michael H. Scarmon, Brotherton v. Cleveland Property Rights in the Human
Body--Are the Goods Oft Interred with Their Bones, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429, 429
(1992).
'64 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 90-92 (C.P. Alleghany County 1978).
165 The third element in this list is particularly relevant later as a consideration
against policies of presumed consent as a way to increase organ supply.
166 See McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 90.
167 id.
168 Id.
16 9 Id. at 90-91.
170 Id. at 90-92.
171 Id. at 90.
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state power over Shimp's organs.1 72 The court held that a decision
to submit to tests or a transplant rested with Shimp, not with the
state. 173 Moreover, the court stated that ruling in favor of McFall
"would change every concept and principle upon which our society
is founded," and in a society "which respects the rights of one
individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of
its members and suck from it sustenance for another member, is
revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of jurisprudence." 174
Several other modem cases are worthy of description due
to their tension between some recognition of the body as personal
property versus a state interest in organs. 175 The tension results
from a policy under which the state "presumes consent" to certain
procedures after a person has died. 176 These procedures may
include recovering some organs or tissues, performing an autopsy,
or conducting other tests that may be considered a violation of the
next-of-kin's property interest in the corpse. 177 Two of the most
important of these cases defining a property interest in a relative's
organs are Brotherton v. Cleveland 78 and the follow-up case of
Whaley v. Tuscola. 
179
172 Id. at 92.
171 Id. at 91-92.
174 Id. at 91-92.
175 The cases in this section are similar to McFall because they are related to
both establishing a property interest in body parts and also maintaining
autonomy concerning that interest in cases where the state would attempt to
claim a superior interest in the organs and tissues.
176 This presumed consent is related to presumed consent for organ donation
discussed later in the article. Both types of presumed consent are instances of
the state asserting a superior interest in a corpse, often in the name of efficiency.
See Morris, supra note 113, at 1125-50.
117 See id
178 Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
widow had rights in her husband's corpse that rose to the level of a "legitimate
claim of entitlement," which implied that his corneas could not be removed
without her consent).
179 Whaley v. Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1117 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
procedural due process rights of the decedent's next of kin were violated when
the decedent's eyeballs were removed without the authorization of the next of
kin).
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In Brotherton, the Sixth Circuit ruled that Ohio state law
recognized a widow's property interest in her deceased husband's
body when his corneas were removed pursuant to state law.' 80 The
court held that the removal of the husband's corneas without due
process for the widow violated her constitutional rights.'' The
court noted that to make a successful due process claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) deprivation, (2) of
property, (3) under color of state law.182 The court, finding that the
deprivation and color of state law requirements were easily met,
determined the central issue to be whether Mrs. Brotherton had a
property interest in her husband's corneas.18 3 The court interpreted
Ohio state law to provide the next of kin some sort of interest in
the decedent's body. 84 According to the court, this interest
qualified as a property interest for purposes of the Due Process
Clause. 185 Using the above reasoning, the court declared that the
state procedures that caused the corneas to be removed without the
widow's consent were unconstitutional and deprived Brotherton of
procedural due process. 86 It is important to note that Brotherton
was by no means the final decision concerning consent and
property rights in bodies. 1
87
Four years after Brotherton, the Sixth Circuit decided a
similar case concerning an almost identical fact pattern under
Michigan law and came to the same conclusion. 18 In Whaley v.
Tuscola, the court noted that Michigan law expressly states that a
family may take possession of a decedent's body for burial.1
89
180 Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
181 Id
182 Id. at 479.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 480-82.
185 Id.
186 Id. In this case, the due process clause violation was argued as procedural.
There are arguments, however, for both a procedural and a substantive due
process right in a person's own body. Eric S. Jaffe, "She's Got Bette Davis[s ']
Eyes ": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the
Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 543-68 (1990).
187 See Whaley v. Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1995).
188 Id.
189Id. at 1115.
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Furthermore, taking possession of the body for burial implied some
sort of possessory right in the body that conflicted with the
government sanctioning the nonconsensual removal of tissue.19
The court declared that there was a due process violation on the
facts and went on to say that, in this "case and Brotherton, the state
cause of action for damaging a corpse explicitly acknowledges the
next of kin's right to possess and prevent the mutilation of the dead
body."'191 This right of protection and control is very similar to
what courts otherwise consider to be a property interest, even if
they are hesitant to use such explicit language.'
92
Cases such as Brotherton and Whaley seem to recognize
that taking tissues under a limited presumed consent law for organ
donations would probably be a violation of the Due Process
Clause. 193 Other courts, however, have come to different
conclusions when considering similar facts. 194 For example,
deciding the same question five years before the Brotherton
decision, the Florida Supreme Court held that the removal of
corneas without the consent of the next of kin is permissible.' 
95
The Florida court noted that corneal removal is a small intrusion
on the body when compared to the large invasion of an autopsy.' 
96
The court found "no taking of private property by state action for a
non-public purpose in violation of... the Florida Constitution.'
197
In addition, the court rejected the idea of substantial property rights
in the corpse by describing them as:
a somewhat dubious "property right" to the body,
usually in the next of kin, which did not exist while
the decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be
used only for the one purpose of burial, and not
only has no pecuniary value but is a source of
liability for funeral expenses. It seems reasonably
'90Id. at 1116-17.
'
911d. at 1117.
192 See Morris, supra note 113, at 1125-50.
'9' See id. at 1145.
194 See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986).
195 Id. at 1193-94.
196 id.
'9' Id. at 1192.
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obvious that such "property" is something evolved
out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that it is in
reality the personal feelings of the survivors which
are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive
no one but a lawyer.
1 98
In yet another pre-Brotherton case, the Fifth Circuit ruled
that there existed no liberty or property interest in the bodies of
deceased children based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.199 The gruesome
facts surrounding that cage, Arnaud v. Odom, involve a coroner
who performed a grisly experiment on the corpses of two babies
who had died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome.2"0 Before
performing the requisite autopsy, he dropped each baby on its head
to examine the damage such a fall would do to an infant's head.20'
The coroner did this to gain evidence to clear his name from a
previous lawsuit. 20 2 The court decided that even though Louisiana
recognized a "quasi-property" interest in a corpse, this did not
create a property interest as required to activate the Due Process
203Clause of the Constitution. ° Thus, both procedural and
substantive due process arguments were considered and rejected.20 4
In Brotheron, Whaley, Powell, and Arnaud, the courts
considered state law when determining whether a property right in
bodies existed for procedural due process purposes.20 5 This will be
important to the subject of body property rights as a whole and
organ markets because the success of challenges to these ideas
could revolve around state law. 206 In addition, states that recognize
198 Id.
199 Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 1989).
201 Id. at 306.
201 id.
202 id.
203 Id. at 309.
204 Id. at 304-09.
205 See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 477-82 (6th Cir. 1991); Whaley
v. Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1111-17 (6th Cir. 1995); State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d
1188, 1188-91 (Fla. 1986); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 304-09 (5th Cir.
1989).
206 See Jaffe, supra note 186, at 543-68. This article explicitly discusses the
possibility of both procedural and substantive due process violations for
presumed consent law. It also considers the importance of state law in
determinations of procedural due process. Id.; see also Newman v.
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property rights in organs are essentially relinquishing state control
by modifying the older common law position that body parts dis
not merit individual property rights.207 States that have recognized
property rights or quasi-property rights, such as in Brotherton or
Whaley, would be more likely to support some form of organ
market.20 8 More recent cases do not rely as much on a state law
procedural due process theory to develop property rights.
The current state of body property rights and tissue control
has recently and famously, or infamously, been explored in the
cases of Moore v. Regents of University of California20 9 and Hecht
v. Superior Court.2  As with the case law before them, these
cases struggle with and differ over the extent of property rights
allowed in tissues. 21 1 Also similar to previous case law, and
foreshadowing this article's focus on a market in human organs,
both cases confront whether the individual or society is ultimately
able to assert a superior claim over this material.212
In Moore, the nation's attention was captured as the facts of
the case presented the California Supreme Court with the profound
questions central to a market in human organs: whether people
own their body parts when the parts are in, or attached to, their
bodies and whether people continue to own them once the parts are
removed from their bodies.213 In 1976, doctors diagnosed John
Moore, the plaintiff, with hairy cell leukemia, a disease that,
ironically, had the potential to create significant commercial and
scientific value in inventions derived from his blood products.
214
Sathyavaglswaran 287 F.3d 786, 795-99 (9th Cir. App. 2002) (holding that
procedural due process property rights were violated by a presumed consent law
that authorized cornea harvesting).
207 See Jaffe, supra note 186, at 543-68.
208 Id.
209 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
210 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
211 See Charles M. Jordan & Casey J. Price, First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn't it
Time We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells, and Gametes?, 37 Real
Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 151, 151-90 (2002).
212 Id.
213 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 487-89.
214 See id. at 480-81. This potential, however, had never been exploited before
with the success that it would be by the creation of the Mo-cell line. Id. at 481-
89.
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Following the diagnosis, and on the advice of his doctors, Moore
consented to the removal of his spleen as the best-known treatment
for the disease.215 Without Moore's knowledge, doctors and
researchers at the University of California at Los Angeles
("UCLA") then developed a valuable cell line from the cells
216removed from Moore's spleen. Without Moore's complete
understanding, these same doctors monitored Moore for seven
years, extracting tissue samples for testing and development
related to the developing cell line.
217
Upon learning of these events, Moore filed a lawsuit in
1984 against the doctors, the Regents of the University of
California, and three other defendants claiming numerous causes
of action.218 He alleged that doctors at UCLA were aware of the
enormous value found in his cells, intentionally chose not to
inform him of it, and used his body parts over an extended period
of time to create a very valuable cell line from Moore's T-
lymphocytes. 219 The doctors then patented the cell line derived
from Moore's cells, the "Mo-cell line," which had a value of three
billion dollars at the time of the trial.220 Given the great value of
the cell line and the fact that his cells were a necessary component
in the production of the cell line, Moore alleged a cause of action
22122
against the doctors for conversion of his cells 2  Specifically,
Moore claimed the following: (1) that he continued to own his
cells after they were removed from his body; (2) that he had a right
to direct their use or nonuse; and (3) that he had never consented to
215 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990).
216 See id. at 481-82.
217 See id. at 481.
218 See id. at 480-82.
219 See id. at 481-82. T-lymphocytes are an important type of immune cell that
are found in the lymph nodes, thymus, and spleen. Coincidentally, they are also
very important in the graft rejection reactions that are so crucial to the survival
of transplanted organs. See ROBBINS PATHOLOGIC BASIS OF DISEASE, supra
note 50, at 209-10.
220 See Moore, 793 P.2d 479 at 482.
221 "An unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over
goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their
condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
332 (6th ed. 1990).
222 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
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their use by the UCLA doctors in the development of the cell
line. 2
23
At the lower appellate court level, the California Court of
Appeals held that Moore had sufficiently shown the tort of
conversion and that he possessed a property interest in his body
and its parts.224 The court held that a "patient must have the
ultimate power to control what becomes of his or her tissues".
2 25
The court further stated, "[t]o hold otherwise would open the door
to a massive invasion of human privacy and dignity in the name of
medical progress.' '226 The Supreme Court of California, however,
did not endorse the lower court's reasoning.22 7 In fact, the court
held that Moore had "abandoned" his cells and summarily rejected
Moore's conversion claim.228 The court also held that it would not
"force the round pegs of 'privacy' and 'dignity' into the square
hole of 'property' in order to protect the patient, since the
fiduciary-duty and informed-consent theories229 protect these
interests directly by requiring full disclosure.
' 230
Perhaps more reasonably, the California Supreme Court
also refused Moore's demand for a property interest in the patent
created from his cells. 231 The court explained that the potential cell
line "is both factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from
223 See id. at 487.
224 See generally Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct.
App. 1988).
225 See id. at 508.
226 Id. This case concluded that Moore must at least have some form of property
interest in the tissues taken from his own body. Id.
227 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 482-89.
228 See id. at 488-89. It is interesting that the court uses the language of
abandonment yet simultaneously does not recognize an explicit property right in
the cells.
229 Informed consent is "voluntary consent given by a person ... for participation
in a study ... after being informed of the purpose, methods, procedures, benefits,
and risks." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 871.
230 Moore, 793 P.2d at 491. The Moore court explained the policy rationale of
its holding and said, "Liability based upon existing disclosure obligations, rather
than an unprecedented extension of the conversion theory, protects patients'
rights of privacy and autonomy without unnecessarily hindering research." Id. at
494.
231 See id at 489.
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Moore's body., 232 After assessing the nature of the Mo-cell line,
the Moore court determined that researchers could patent human
cell lines because the long-term growth of human tissues and cells
is so difficult that it is often considered an art.233 The court
concluded that, with the UCLA doctors' creative efforts, the Mo-
cell line and the products derived from it, became the property of
the University Regents, not of Moore.
234
The Moore opinion suggests a holding concerned with
promoting the research efforts of scientists, particularly those in
the promising field of biotechnology. 235 The desire to foster
growth in biotechnology resulted in careful language designed to
avoid granting property rights in cells that may result in dampening
economic incentives for biological research.236 The court also
noted that at the time of the litigation there were 350
biotechnology companies in the United States, and approximately
twenty five to thirty percent of those companies were developing
products that required access to human cells. 237 The court also
feared that every cell sample used by a researcher would be like a
ticket purchased to a "litigation lottery., 238 The court was
concerned that recognizing a property interest in cells would
necessitate some sort of tracking system even more elaborate than
those currently in place for every cell removed from someone,
even those removed for therapeutic purposes. 239 Obviously, if this
end came about, this type of system would greatly increase the cost
of biotechnological research and completely discourage some
232 Id. at 492.
233 Id. at 493.
234 See id. at 492-93.
235 One could also imagine a decision granting Moore a property right in his
cells that could have still found them "abandoned" or altered so much by the
scientist's creativity so that they were no longer his by the time they became part
of the Mo-cell line. The current decision allows Moore a type of victory
through the fiduciary duty mechanism. It did not take any more steps than were
necessary to reach that result, always careful to avoid treading on any ground
that could harm the booming biotechnology and medical industries.
236 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 494-95.
237 Id.
2381 d. at 496.
239 See id. at 524.
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research efforts.24 °
Considering all of the above, the court decided against
recognizing a cause of action for the conversion of Moore's
cells. 241 As a result, the Moore court refused to recognize a
property interest in tissues or cells that had been removed from
one's body for therapeutic purposes and chose, instead, to rely on
the doctrine of informed consent to protect patients from
unscrupulous doctors.
242
The Moore reasoning is accepted as the current state of the
law concerning property rights in tissues extracted for research
243purposes. Because the Moore court relied on informed consent
as a way of avoiding the issue of property rights in tissue
generally,244 scholars have argued that the court did not reach a
true decision regarding property rights in tissues and that the
court's property interest dicta should be limited to surreptitiously
245extracted research tissues.
Hecht v. Superior Court2 4 6 is important to this article
because the case arose after Moore, making it one of the most
recent cases to wrestle with the idea of the body as property.247
The case began as an action by the decedent's live-in girlfriend,
240 Id.
241 See id. at 497.
242 See id. at 491-95.
243 See Jordan & Price, supra note 211, at 164.
244 See Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-95.
245 See Banks, supra note 13, at 65. But see Jordan & Price, supra note 211, at
164. The interpretation of such an important case, dealing with fundamental
issues and with such terrific consequences, is almost certain to be in contention
for some time to come even if the Supreme Court eventually makes a decision
on the issue.
246 Hecht is actually a collection of three cases. Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.
App. 4th 836, 843-48 (Ct. App. 1993); Kane v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th
1577 (Ct. App. 1995); Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Ct. App.
1996). The 1996 Hecht case was ordered not to be published and, therefore, has
no other reference than the one listed above. It was ordered deleted by the
California Supreme Court on January 15, 1997. "An order of the Supreme
Court directing depublication of an opinion in the Official Reports shall not be
deemed an expression of opinion of the Supreme Court of the correctness of the
result reached by the decision or of any of the law set forth in the opinion." CAL.
CT. R. 979.
247 See Jordan & Price, supra note 211, at 177.
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Deborah Hecht.248 Hecht lived with the decedent, William Kane,
for approximately five years. 249 Kane froze fifteen vials of sperm
and bequeathed this sperm to Hecht. 250 Kane later committed
suicide after losing $20,000 in Las Vegas. 25 Hecht commenced an
248 See Hecht, 16 Cal.App. 4th at 839-40.
249 See id.
250 See id. at 840. Kane's intentions were indisputable and backed by several
sources. The will read "I bequeath all right, title, and interest that I may have in
any specimens of my sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for
storage to Deborah Ellen Hecht." Id. In addition, the Statement of Wishes
section of the will provided, "It being my intention that samples of my sperm
will be stored at a sperm bank for the use of Deborah Ellen Hecht, should she so
desire, it is my wish that, should [Hecht] become impregnated with my sperm,
before or after my death," she may ignore earlier will provisions for the
disposition of certain diplomas and mementoes if she instead prefers to preserve
them for Kane and Hecht's future children. Id. Finally, Kane also had a
contract with the sperm bank that read, "I, William Everett Kane,... authorize
the [sperm bank] to release my semen specimens (vials) to Deborah Ellen Hecht.
I am also authorizing specimens to be released to recipient's physician Dr.
Kathryn Moyer." Id.
251 His will also contained a letter to his children, born and unborn, explaining
the circumstances surrounding his death:
I address this to my children, because, although I have only
two, Everett and Katy, it may be that Deborah will decide--as I
hope she will--to have a child by me after my death. I've been
assiduously generating frozen sperm samples for that
eventuality. If she does, then this letter is for my posthumous
offspring, as well, with the thought that I have loved you in
my dreams, even though I never got to see you born. If you
are receiving this letter, it means that I am dead--whether by
my own hand or that of another makes very little difference. I
feel that my time has come; and I wanted to leave you with
something more than a dead enigma that was your father....
I am inordinately proud of who I have been--what I made of
me. I'm so proud of that that I would rather take my own life
now than be ground into a mediocre existence by my enemies-
-who, because of my mistakes and bravado have gained the
power to finish me.... So why am I checking out now?
Basically, betrayal, over and over again, has made me tired.
I've picked up some heavyweight enemies along the way--
ranging from the Kellys of the world, to crazies with guns, to
insurance companies, to the lawyers that have sucked me dry..
. I don't want to die as a tired, perhaps defeated and bitter
old man. I'd rather end it like I have lived it--on my time,
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action in order to recover Kane's sperm. Kane's two adult
children sought to prevent her from obtaining the fifteen vials of
sperm that Kane had deposited in an account at a Los Angeles
sperm bank.253
In Hecht, the most important issue to be decided was
whether the sperm vials were the property of Kane's estate and, by
extension, whether he could have a property interest in those vials
and direct their distribution. 254 The court approached the issue by
first determining the definition of property and then examining
whether sperm met the definition. The court distinguished the
instant case's facts from those of Moore by noting that there was
an explicit contract with the sperm bank describing Kane's
expectation of control and his intent of disposal.25 The court was
specifically concerned with Kane's intent because the court desired
the vials be distributed according to that intent. 7 The court itself
summarized the evidence that indicated Kane's intent.258 It also
determined that Kane had "an interest in the nature of ownership"
in the vials stored with the sperm bank.2 5 9 Finally, the court
reasoned that once gametes 26 are dealt with as a form of property,
the analysis then hinges on whether the owner has demonstrated
sufficient intent to dispose of the individual's gametes. 26 1 Given
when and where I will, and while my life is still an object of
self-sculpture--a personal creation with which I am still proud.
In truth, death for me is not the opposite of life; it is a form of
life's punctuation.
See Hecht, 16 Cal.App. 4th at 841.
252 See id.
253 See id.
254 See Jordan & Price, supra note 211, at 177.
255 See Hecht, 16 Cal.App. 4th at 845-50.
256 See id. at 846 n.4. In fact, Moore never had any hope of seeing his spleen
again. As far as he was informed, it was not only useless to him, but had to be
removed as part of the treatment for his disease. Id.
257 See Hecht Hecht, 16 Cal.App. 4th at 839-40.
258 Id. This evidence included the contract Kane had with the sperm bank, the
explicit provisions in his will and the Statement of Wishes in his will. Id.
259 See Heeht Hecht, 16 Cal.App. 4th at 846.
260 Gametes are reproductive cells, or sperm and egg cells for humans.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 47, at 701.
261 See id. at 839-46.
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the great amount of evidence in favor of Kane's intent to leave
Hecht his sperm, the court first granted an injunction against
destroying the vials and, in later hearings, granted Hecht
possession of all the vials.262
Hecht is central to the thesis of this article because it
explicitly recognizes property rights in human cells and, perhaps,
represents a modest case law shift in favor of recognizing these
rights generally.263 In addition, Hecht is the only case to date
expressly focusing on whether gametes may be bequeathed and
inherited, acts which are intimately tied with our traditional notions
of property distribution. 26 4 Finally, Hecht is also a case that, like
Moore, arose as a direct result of advances in medical technology
that are forcing a reconsideration of legal doctrines. 265 Courts and
leading medical organizations consider these legal doctrines, and
they will arguably help shape future legal decisions.266
Everything about transplantation is a commercial
transaction. 67 The hospital, the physician, and the staff all make a
living from transplantation and other life saving procedures. 268
Given the case law and current tissue selling practices in support of
property rights in bodies, one may ask what is preventing organ
sales? The answer explored below is a combination of
organizational policy declarations and statutory provisions.
B. Organizations
Organizations involved in transplantation are important as
collections of experts that lawmakers may look to when making
decisions about transplantation.269 Therefore, the policies and
262 See id. at 861.
161 See Hecht, 16 Cal.App. 4th at 849.
264 See id at 848-49.
265 Id.
266 Live Organ Donor Consensus Group, Consensus Statement on the Live
Organ Donor, 284 JAMA 2919, 2919-26 (2000) [hereinafter Consensus
Statement].
267 Roger W. Evans & Daniel J. Kitzmann, An Economic Analysis of Kidney
Transplantation, 78 Renal Transplantation 149, 149-71 (1998).
268 Id.
269 See Consensus Statement, supra note 266, at 2919-26.
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opinions of the world's leading medical and transplantation
organizations may be viewed as an enlightened barometer
indicating the future of law in this area.
Initially, nearly every national and international
organization adopted a blanket policy against the sale of organs.
2 7 1
In addition, most nations have had laws against the sale of organs
dating from the birth of transplantation in the 1960's and 70S.272
Not all laws, however, have been against the sale of organs for
transplantation, and there are some governments and organizations
that support some form of organ market or sale.
273
The Transplantation Society is a thirty-five-year-old
international transplantation organization that is the "principal
international forum for basic and clinical transplantation science
throughout the world., 274 The Society's position on the sale of
organs has been essentially the same since it first undertook to
study the issue in the early 1980's: "Organs and tissues should be
freely given without commercial consideration or commercial
profit."2
75
270 See id. at 2919-26.
271 See PRICE, supra note 16, at 376.
272 See id.
273 See id at 369-72. These include both the state of Pennsylvania and the
American Medical Association. To a lesser extent, they also include countries,
such as India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Iraq, that have had a healthy black
market organ trade without enforcing existing laws against the sale of organs.
Each of these is discussed in more detail later. Id.
274 Transplantation Society, Overview, at http://www.transplantation-soc.org/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
275 Transplantation Society, Position of the Transplantation Society on Paid
Organ Donation, (quoting from the June 1995 issue of the Society Bulletin) at
http://www.transplantation-soc.org/policy/policy.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). Benedict
Cosimi, Councilor and Chairman of the Ethics Committee for the
Transplantation Society recognizes in the Transplantation Society's policy
statement that the success of transplantation is the driving force behind the
demand for a market in human organs:
The dramatic success of organ replacement over the past three
decades has resulted in referral of progressively increasing
numbers of patients to compete for the limited number of
allografts available for transplantation. The inadequate supply
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The World Health Organization ("WHO"), founded in 1948
276by the United Nations, also opposes organ sales. On May 15,
1989, the WHO adopted resolution WHA42.5, which prevents the
purchase and sale of human organs. 277 Importantly, the WHO has
of suitable donors has rapidly become the major obstacle to
further extension of this life-saving therapy to patients being
maintained on dialysis or dying with end-stage disease of
other vital organs. Among the potential solutions that have
been offered to increase organ donation has been the
suggestion that some economic incentive be provided either to
the individual, in the case of a living kidney donor, or to the
family or estate of a cadaver donor.
Recognizing the potential controversies that could arise from
the commercialization or brokerage of transplantable organs,
the Ethics Committee and the Council of the Transplantation
Society first addressed this matter in the early 1980's. Their
clear concern was that if the organ donation process were to be
relegated to the laws of the market place, particularly when the
less privileged might be exploited to improve the health of the
more privileged, the established safeguards surrounding
altruistic donation would likely be compromised. After
considerable deliberation, specific guidelines for practice were
agreed upon. The concluding resolution was that: "No
transplant surgeon/team shall be involved directly or indirectly
in the buying or selling of organs/tissues or in any transplant
activity aimed at commercial gain to himself/herself or an
associated hospital or institute."
See supra note 72 for allograft definition.
276 World Health Organization, About WHO, at http://www.who.int/about/en/
(last visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
277 World Health Organization, World Health Assembly Resolutions and
Decisions Sessions 1-55 (June 1948-May 2001), http://policy.who.int/cgi-
bin/om_isapi.dll?infobase=WHA&softpage=BrowseFrame Pg42 (last updated
Oct. 24, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
The relevant portion of the text of WHA42.5 is:
The Forty-second World Health Assembly,
Concerned by the commercial trafficking in the organs of
healthy donors, which exploits human distress and puts at
increased risk the health of the donors;
Aware that commercial arrangements for organ transplants are
nevertheless being undertaken and that to date there has been
little success in preventing trafficking in human organs;
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recognized that the success of transplantation technology, coupled
with the organ shortage, has driven the development of a black
market in international organ sales of non-related living donors. 27
8
The American Medical Association ("AMA") opposes
financial incentives generally, but it is interested in exploring the
possibilities.279 The AMA is generally against paying for an organ
Anxious to prevent the exploitation of human distress,
particularly in children and other vulnerable groups, and to
further the recognition of the ethical principles which
condemn the buying and selling of organs for purposes of
transplantation;
1. CALLS UPON Member States to take appropriate
measures to prevent the purchase and sale of human organs for
transplantation;
2. RECOMMENDS that Member States introduce legislation
to prohibit trafficking in organs where this cannot effectively
be prevented by other measures;
3. URGES Member States, in close cooperation with
professional health organizations and supervising health
authorities, to discourage all practices which facilitate
commercial trafficking in organs;
4. REQUESTS Member States to report as soon as possible to
WHO on action taken with respect to this resolution;
5. REQUESTS the Director-General to report to the Forty-
fourth World Health Assembly the measures taken by the
governments of Member States in furtherance of this
resolution.
Id.
278 PRICE, supra note 16, at 368 (citing the World Health Organization. WHO,
Guiding Principals on Organ Transplantation, 1991).279 American Medical Association, H-3 70. 000 Organ Donation and
Transplantation, http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pfonline/pfonline?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/H-
370.000.HTM (last visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology). This link contains policy H-370.979:
Ethical Aspects of Future Contracts for Cadaveric Donors:
The AMA has adopted the following guidelines for a pilot
program of financial incentives for future contracts regarding
organ donations: (1) There is enough evidence in favor of
employing some form of financial incentive to justify the
implementation of a pilot program. This program, as with any
policy involving financial incentives to encourage organ
donation, should have adequate regulatory safeguards to
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from a living donor but would consider a "pilot program" that
offered futures contracts280 for cadaveric organ donations, provided
that the payment was "moderate" and the "lowest amount that can
reasonably be expected to encourage organ donation.
28l
ensure that the health of donors and recipients is in no way
jeopardized, and that the quality of the organ supply is not
degraded. This pilot program should operate for a limited
time, in a limited geographical region, and have the following
safeguards. (2) Incentives should be limited to future contracts
offered to prospective donors. By entering into a future
contract, an adult would agree while still competent to donate
his or her organs after death. In return, the appropriate state
agency would agree to give some financial remuneration to the
donor's family or estate after the organs have been retrieved
and judged medically suitable for transplantation. Under a
system of future contracts, several other conditions would
apply: (a) No incentives should be allowed for organs
procured from living donors. (b) It would be inappropriate to
offer financial incentives for organ donation to anyone other
than the person who would actually serve as the source of the
organs. Only the potential donor, and not the potential
donor's family or other third party, may be given the option of
accepting financial incentives for the donation of his or her
own organs. In addition, the potential donor must be a
competent adult when the decision to donate is made, and the
donor must not have committed suicide. (c) Any incentive
should be of moderate value and should. be the lowest amount
that can reasonably be expected to encourage organ donation.
By designating a state agency to administer the incentive, full
control over the level of incentive can be maintained. (d)
Payment of any incentive should occur only after the
harvested organs have been judged medically suitable for
transplantation. Suitability should continue to be determined
in accordance with the procedures of the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network. (e) Incentives should play no
part in the allocation of donated organs among potential
transplant recipients. The distribution of organs for
transplantation should continue to be governed only by
ethically appropriate criteria relating to medical need. (CEJA
Rep. 1-93-6)
280 This type of contract is a contract in which a person becomes an organ donor
during life, and some type of consideration is paid to their estate at death.
281 The American Medical Association, H-370.979: Financial Incentives for
Organ Procurement,
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C. Legislation
There is more state, national, and international legislation
controlling the sale of organs than could possibly be covered in
282less than a book. In the United States, however, two statutes
essentially prevent organ sales and describe legal procurement and
283distribution methods. One of these is a federal statute, and the
other is a uniform statute, adopted by essentially every state.
284
This section will also explore one additional progressive statute in
Pennsylvania, which allows a small gift payment to the donor's
estate in exchange for donating organs.
1. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)
1968/1987-Universal Adoption 285
In an effort to facilitate the transplantation of hearts and
kidneys, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in 1968.286
As time passed, however, certain inadequacies in the 1968 version
became obvious, and the UAGA was revised in 1987.287 In short,
the UAGA allows anyone who is eighteen years or older to make
http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pfonline/pf online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HOD/H-
370.979.HTM&&s t=&stjp=&nth=1 &prevpol=policyfiles/HOD/H-
365.999.HTM&nxt pol=policyfiles/HOD/H-370.972.HTM& (last visited Mar.
22, 2003); see also American Medical Association, supra note 279 and
accompanying text.
282 See generally PRICE, supra note 16 (highlighting that prohibition against the
sale of organs is so deeply held in Brazil that the Brazilian Constitution states
that transplantation shall not be the subject of any commercial transaction. Id. at
376.)
283 See Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163,
176-82 (2000).
284 Id. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2(a) (1987); National Organ Transplant Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (1984).
285 See Jordan & Price, supra note 211, at 159 n35. (providing an entire statute
list for every state).
286 Jordan & Price, supra note 211, at 158.
287 See PRICE, supra note 16, at 99-100.
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or refuse to make an organ donation. 28 8 The UAGA spells out
many procedures and guidelines that must be stringently adhered
to by all parties involved in the removal and eventual use of the
organ, regardless of whether the organ is ultimately used for
research or transplantation purposes.289 Importantly for this article,
the UAGA also states that someone "may not knowingly, for
valuable consideration, purchase or sell an organ for
transplantation or therapy, if removal of the part is intended to
occur after the death of the decedent., 290 Additionally, the
punishment for buying or selling organs under UAGA is up to a
$50,000 fine and five years in prison.291 Also of note, the UAGA
language does not permit sale if the organ is "intended to occur
after the death of the decedent." 292 This language arguably leaves
open the possibility of a living donor market in organs, such as
liver portions, kidneys, and lungs, which may be removed while
the donor is still living.
The UAGA fails to address whether property rights exist in
regenerating tissues, such as blood and sperm. The UAGA does
not prohibit the sale of such tissues, and such a market in them
does exist.2 94 As was demonstrated in the case law section of this
article, property rights and the right of sale for these tissues
currently are more respected by courts than they have been in the
295past. Interestingly, when addressing the sale of regenerating
body fluids, most states have statutorily characterized such fluids
as a type of service, rather than as a sale of goods.296 This legal
fiction protects donors and suppliers from product liability should
injuries, such as disease, result from the supplied blood or fluid.297
When considering a market in organs, it is crucial to note
that the 1987 version of the UAGA, now adopted wholly or
288 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2(a).
289 Id. §§ 1-17.
290 Id § 10(a).
291 Id. § 10(c).
292 Id. § 10(a).
293 Jordan & Price, supra note 211, at 159.
294 Id.
295 See supra notes 146-268 and accompanying text.
296 ScoTT, supra note 2, at 180-8 1.
297 Id.
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partially by all fifty states and the District of Columbia,298 is the
primary statutory authority that recognizes property rights in the
299human body. UAGA provisions treat the body and body parts as
property of the individual for gift purposes. 300 The body's parts
may be donated by the consent of the decedent before death and
may also be devised in the decedent's will.3'
2. National Organ Transplant Act
The National Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA") is the only
federal law that regulates the procurement, distribution, and
transplantation of human organs. 302 Passed by Congress in 1984,
the NOTA provides regulatory guidance on organ procurement and
donation. 30 3 In fact, the NOTA has been essential in the creation
of the current national organ donation system, which was designed
to meet the growing demand for organs.30 4 Importantly, the Act
created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
("OPTN"), which is discussed in more detail in section IV(A) of
this article.30 5
The NOTA specifically prohibits "any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for
valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the
transfer affects interstate commerce." 306 As with the UAGA, the
punishment for selling organs is five years in prison or a $50,000
fine.307 For market purposes, this federal law is more restrictive
than the UAGA because it prohibits organ sale during life and
death if the sale could be interpreted to affect interstate
298 See Jordan & Price, supra note 211, at 159 n35. (providing an entire statute
list for every state).
299 Id. at 159.
300 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2(a) (1987).
301 id.
302 National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 273-274 (1984).
303 id.
304 Jordan, supra note 211, at 157.
305 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274.
306 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a).
307 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b).
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commerce. 308 NOTA is essentially a broad prohibition on valuable
consideration in exchange for human organs.
30 9
There are two positive aspects to the NOTA for organ
market purposes. First, the statute specifically defines the term
"organ," and the statute does not interpret an organ to include
blood, sperm, and ova. Because of this definition, blood, sperm,
and ova can be legally sold to donees or organizations for valuable
consideration. Second, and more importantly, the NOTA
defines the term "valuable consideration" to exclude "the
reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation,
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage
of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost
wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with
the donation of the organ." 312 For market purposes, this may open
up avenues for compensation that allow donors to be legally
compensated broadly for organ donation, including transplant cost,
travel, and lost wages. 313 Furthermore, this language may provide
a modest beginning toward some allowable form of
compensation. 3 14 A new law in Pennsylvania, for instance, may be
using this broad compensation language allowable through NOTA
to compensate donees.
315
308 42 U.S.C. § 274e.
309 Id.
3 10 
id.
3" 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2).
312 42 U.S.C. § 274e.
313 Jordan & Price, supra note 211, at 158.314 id.
315 See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8621-8622 (West 1994) (allowing some
compensatory benefits to be paid by a trust for expenses resulting from
donation).
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3. Pennsylvania Act No. 102 of 1994-Organ
Donation Awareness Trust Fund.1 6
In 1994, Pennsylvania passed Act 102, which created the
Governor Robert P. Casey Memorial Organ and Tissue Donation
Awareness Trust Fund.31 7 This fund is supported through one-
dollar voluntary donations on driver's licenses and vehicle
registrations. 318 The fund provides up to $3,000 per donor to help
with the cost of "reasonable hospital and other medical expenses,
funeral expenses and incidental expenses incurred by the donor or
donor's family in connection with making a vital organ
donation., 319 The money is paid directly to the hospital, funeral
home, hotel, or other organization responsible for providing the
service the donor requires for the transplant. 32 No part of the
money goes directly to the "donor's family, next of kin or estate,"
and it is all for donation-related expenditures.
32 1
Even though the Act became law in 1994, an actual
program that paid expense benefits did not result until January
3222002. The trust fund has more than one million dollars, and
three million Pennsylvanians have signed up tobe organ donors.
323
Even by the end of 2000, when the fund was not yet paying
expense benefits, 37.4% of Pennsylvania drivers had signed up to
316 Id. The fund was named after Robert Casey, the former Pennsylvania
governor and a multiple organ transplant recipient. Pennsylvania State
Representative Bill Robinson helped create the fund after he learned that the
mother of a boy whose heart and liver were donated to Casey had no life
insurance benefits and had to raise money to be able to afford to bury her son.
Ovetta Wiggins, Pa. Organ Donors Get a $300 Boost, PHIL. INQUIRER, May 27,
2002, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/3346239.htm;
Pennsylvania Department of Health, Organ Donation Awareness, at
http://www.health.state.pa.us/php/organ/organdon.htm. (last visited Mar. 22,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
317 PRICE, supra note 16, at 371.
318 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8621-8622 (West 1994).
319 id.
320 Id. at § 8622(b)(1).
321 Id.
322 Wiggins, supra note 316.
323 Harris I, supra note 3, at 227.
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be organ donors.324 The current version of the program only
distributes a $300 benefit.325 In spite of the reduction from the
$3,000 authorized to the $300 current payment, nineteen donors or
donor families applied for the benefit in the first six months of
operation between January and May. 326 Eighteen of the nineteen
donor applicants were living, and one donor applicant was
deceased.327
In the coming years, this pilot program will help answer
many questions about compensated organ donation. 328 The
program is an implicit recognition of property rights in body parts
and an example of the state yielding to individual choice and
329compensation. One could view the fund as a type of limited
organ market. In this market, the state is compensating donors
with a fixed price for donation. If successful, the program could
pave the way for other organ market permutations.
The relevant terms having been defined, and the paper,
having canvassed the current state of law and medicine, the
discussion now focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of
recognizing property rights and developing a market in organs in
the face of competing individual and state claims over human
bodies.
324 Pennsylvania Governor's Office Press Release from 12/21/00, at
http://www.health.state.pa.us/NR/2000/GovCasey.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). There
was a 59% increase in organ donor registration between 1995 and 2001. The
trust was part of a larger plan that included drivers license solicitations for organ
donation. Michelle Start, Many Drivers Steering Clear of State's Organ Donor
Registration, VALLEY NEWS DISPATCH (Tarentum, PA), April 30, 2001,
available at http://www.pnpa.com/keystone/2002/tarentum 12.htm (last visited
Mar. 22, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
325 Wiggins, supra note 316.326 Id. Donor families apply for money for food or lodging and that money, up
to $300, is paid directly to the restaurant or hotel. The reduction from a $3,000
to a $300 benefit has been cursed by the law's original proponents as an "insult"
to families and as being insubstantial to genuinely help donor families. Id.3 27 id. .
328 See Harris I, supra note 3, at 227.
329 , ,
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IV. The Status Quo, Markets, Alternatives, and Criticisms of
Each
A. Body Parts, Tissues, Fluids, and Other Derivatives
for Sale
330
Hair has been sold for centuries for use by wigmakers.
Teeth have been sold and fixed into the jaws of patients since the
Elizabethan era.33 1 Blood is sold in the United States, Europe, and
33233
much of the world. Sperm and eggs are now routinely sold.333
Donors are "compensated" in language that thinly disguises the
economic reality of the sale.334 Placental tissue from live births
may be sold to cosmetic companies, and fetal tissue from abortions
can also be transferred for money.335 Not surprisingly, there have
also been calls for changing the completely altruistic volunteer
market in human milk to a compensated market because of need.336
Finally, whole bodies are exchanged for money to medical schools
that have used them for centuries in anatomy classes.337 A blurry
line appears to have been drawn between tissues, which regenerate,
330 ScoTT, supra note 2, at 180-81.
331 ld.
332 Id. Blood as a market item in the United States is actually classified as a
"service" rather than a "good" for liability reasons. As one might imagine, this
legal fiction has contributed to some interesting cases, including that of Ms.
Dorothy Garber, who was fortunate to have a very rare and valuable antibody
present in her blood. In the 1970's, the forty-two year old mother of three was
paid $25,000 cash, 1000 shares of stock, $200 per week and the use of a
company car by a biotechnology company interested in her blood. She was
creatively not reporting this income, which led to a charge and conviction for
criminal tax evasion. United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843, 843-51 (5th Cir.
1979).
333 See Charo, supra note 148, at 433-35.
334 Id. Sperm and egg donation can bring large sums of money to donors. Egg
donation on a per harvest basis and sperm donation over a long donation period
can generate sums well into the thousands of dollars. Id.
335 Charo, supra note 148, at 423.
336 Sarah Waldeck, Encouraging a Market in Human Milk, 11 COLUM. J.
GENDER& L. 361, 361-406 (2002).
337 See Mahoney, supra note 283, at 169-70.
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and organs, which do not regenerate. 338 It is useful to compare the
active tissue trade against the more regulated system for organs.
The Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS")
oversees the OPTN. 339 The chosen OPTN is a private entity called
the United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"). 3 4 0 UNOS
coordinates the matching, procurement and distribution of organs
for transplant using a national system.34 1 Under the current
system, Organ Procurement Organizations ("OPOs") are paid
acquisition fees to recover organs from donors.342 These OPOs are
statutorily regulated, state or regional non-profit entities that
supply organs to UNOS for coordinated matching of donors and
recipients.343 After matching, hospitals purchase organs from the
OPOs. 344 The patient is responsible for paying the hospital for the
procedure, the organ procurement cost, and the physicians, nurses,
and other staff involved in the operation. 345 For example, the
actuarial estimate for a kidney transplant in 1996 was $81,900 with
total five-year charges estimated at $171,700.346 Heart and lung
transplants can cost substantially more with $250,000 billed in the
first year, and liver transplants are billed at more than $300,000 in
the first year.
34 7
338 See id. at 180-92. There are many exceptions to this blurry rule, the most
notable of which is that human eggs may be sold even though they are not
regenerative. Id.
339 UNOS ORGAN PROCUREMENT, PRESERVATION AND DISTRIBUTION IN
TRANSPLANTATION 1-6 (Michael G. Phillips, ed., 2nd ed. 1996) [hereinafter
UNOS ORGAN PROCUREMENT]. The DHHS is advised on organ donation by the
Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation, which maintains an informative
website that includes their recommendations to the Secretary for Health and
Human Services at http://www.organdonor.gov/acot.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
340 See UNOS ORGAN PROCUREMENT, supra note 339, at 1-6.
341 id.
342 Mahoney, supra note 283, at 180.
143 42 U.S.C. § 274(b) (1984).
34 Mahoney, supra note 283, at 180.
345 Evans & Kitzmann, supra note 267, at 162.
346 Id. at 149-71. Charges should be considered separately from cost. Charges
represent what the hospital bills, and cost represents what hospital actually
spends for the products and services. Id.
347 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION:
ASSESSING CURRENT POLICIES AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE DHHS
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This system looks like a standard commercial stream with a
supplier, middlemen, value added processing, and, finally, an
348expensive installation procedure. There is money changing
hands at every level in the system other than at the level of the
primary supplier, the organ donor.349 It is also clear that
transplants are limited by the number of donors. 350 This supply-
side limitation is one of the strongest arguments for using a market
system to grant incentives to encourage more people to donate.
351
Hospitals claim that the patient is not actually paying for
the organ in a transplantation procedure. 352 The patient is paying
merely for medical treatment, never for the organ. 35 3 Yet, the
transplantation service would not exist without the organ.
354
Furthermore, one cannot acquire the organs without the service;
355
they are sold together as an indivisible package. 356 It may be
analogous to eating at a restaurant where one does not pay for the
food, yet food is carefully prepared and served.357 The bill that
ultimately comes is just for the "dining services. 358 Framed in
this way, it requires a difficult suspension of disbelief for anyone
to think that they are not paying for the organ.
359
FINAL RULE 126 (1999), available at
http://books.nap.eduIbooks/030906578X/html (last visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology). This text includes a
table that lists the first year charges for many common transplants, including
heart ($253,200), lung ($265,900), kidney ($116,100), pancreas ($125,800), and
liver ($314,500). Id.
348 See Mahoney, supra note 283, at 179-182.
349 Id.
3 50 id.
351 David Kasserman, Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions, 18 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 567, 568 (2002).
352 Mahoney, supra note 283, at 169-70.
353 Id.
35 4 ld.
35 5 id.
3 56 id.
35 7 id.
358 id.
359 id.
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B. Market Concerns
There are valid concerns about using a market approach to
increase the supply of organs.36 ° One primary worry is that the
altruistic system will die if a compensated organ market is
implemented.361 Another concern is that a market system will
exploit and coerce the poor.362 Critics are especially worried about
how organ sales have gone particularly badly overseas and on the
black market.363 The wealthy may gain an inequitable access to
organs in an organ market. 364 There may be an increase in
diseased organs if compensation is offered.365 Scholars also offer
the presumed consent model as a way to bypass paying for organs
and still allow for an increase in the organ supply.36 6 Many of
these concerns are difficult to deal with, and all are worthy of
discussion, but some may be worries that are disproportionate to
the real consequences, or concerns that are based on a
misunderstanding of market possibilities.3
67
Some scholars have argued that the altruistic market is too
important to the organ procurement effort and that it would be
destroyed by a compensated organ market.368 Proponents of the
altruistic system value organs as items beyond price.369 A
response to this concern is that a compensated organ market and
altruistic giving are not mutually exclusive. 37 These two
procurement systems may exist side by side.371 Items that can be
sold can also be given. 372 It is also the case that people may view
360 Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a
Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,20-24 (1994).
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a
Kidney in India, 288 JAMA 1589, 1589-92 (2002).
364 See Crespi, supra note 360, at 20-24.
365 Id.
366 See Morris, supra note 113, at 1135-42.
367 See Kasserman, supra note 351, at 567-80.
368 See Crespi, supra note 360, at 20-24.
369 Id.
370 See id at 20-28.
371 Id.
372 id.
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something given, that could have been sold, as a particularly
valuable and noble gift.
373
Scholars have claimed that selling organs would result in
the poor literally sacrificing a pound of flesh, or exchanging
resources they need for bodily integrity. 374 When considering
market discrimination and the exploitation of the poor, one should
first consider that the current organ system has been accused of
discriminating against the poor and minority racial groups. 375 An
advantage created by a market system would be an increased
supply of organs. 376 An increased supply would almost certainly
mean lowered costs, which would benefit all groups, especially the
poor.377 One could view continuation of the current system as an
378infringement on autonomy and a form of oppression of the poor.
Not only would current difficulties continue and prices remain
high under the current system, but removing an avenue of organ
sale or compensation removes an alternative method of income for
people who may believe that the possible benefit received from
donating an organ is worth the cost. 379 Prohibiting organ markets
373Id
374 David J. Rothman, Ethical and Social Consequences of Selling a Kidney, 288
JAMA 1640, 1640-41 (2002).
375 Ian Ayres et al., Unequal Racial Access to Kidney Transplantation, 46 VAND.
L. Rev. 805, 808-09 (1993). The concerns focus on the fact that whites donate
ninety percent of the kidneys, and a disproportionate number of people on the
kidney waiting list are black, due to their increased susceptibility for end stage
renal disease. When this is combined with the fact that matching is often best
done within the same racial groups because of hereditary factors, there is a
mismatch between donors and need that increases wait times for minorities. Id.
The death of football legend Walter Payton also provides a case study
representing some of the tensions surrounding the current organ procurement
and distribution program. His liver disease was treatable with transplantation,
yet he died while on the waiting list. His case raises questions about the relative
importance of race and wealth in the face of a donor shortage. Encouraging
Organ and Tissue Donation, at
http://www.senate.gov/-durbin/Legislation/organ.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
376 See Kasserman, supra note 351, at 567-69.
377 See id. at 567-80.
378 See Ayres et al., supra note 375, at 806-09.
379 JOHN HARRIS, CLONES, GENES, AND IMMORTALITY 157-70 (1998)
[hereinafter HARRIS II].
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removes an opportunity for economic advancement that could be
present under a market system. 380
Consider the following example. 381 If a mother were to go
into a burning building to save the life of her child, it would be
considered an act of heroism. 382 The parent risks her own body,
sometimes harming herself or forfeiting her own life to save the
life of her child.383 The sale of an organ can be considered in a
similar light.384 There are places in the world where some families
have very few opportunities and very little property other than their
bodies.385 In the name of protecting the poor, society may actually
be denying them the use of one of the few assets they have, their
bodies and, by extension, their personal autonomy.386 One could
argue that society, by using governmental organizations usually
controlled by the affluent, is helping to oppress the poor by
claiming that there should be "other ways" or better social
programs instead of allowing the volitional sale of organs.387 It
could be considered heroic for a parent to sell an organ so that a
child may have an education and better opportunities than the
388parent had. It would also certainly benefit the organ recipient,.
380 See id.
381 Id. In this example, one could substitute any family member for the child
benefiting from the analogous organ market. The author has chosen to use a
child saved from a burning building because it is an example familiar to local
news and freshman philosophy classes. An acknowledged weakness of this
thought experiment is that the organ donor would ideally use the funds derived
from an organ market for the good of her family and not for destructive or
counterproductive aims. A donor using funds derived from an organ sale for
good rather than ill is a hopeful assumption, but a realistic possibility with a
compensated organ market. Id
382 HARRIS II, supra note 379, at 169.
383 See id.
384 See id.
385 See id. at 142-70.
386 id.
387 Id. A point closely related to the above discussion is that every person in
society, including the poor, volitionally may take the risk of working in
dangerous professions. Indeed, the poor hold many of the more dangerous
manual labor positions in society. This type of calculated risk and individual
autonomy in exchange for reward is the status quo, if not normally encouraged,
and similar to the choices involved in selling organs. See id.
388 HARRIS II, supra note 379, at 169.
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the random victim of disease.389 Using the burning building
analogy, the parent is actually going into the building to save
possibly both her child and a stranger in need.390
Society should also ponder current black market pricing
and the terrible consequences resulting from these illegal organ
sales, including the use of diseased organs. 391 The price paid on
the black market for a good can generally be said to be one of the
highest prices possible for that good.392 Current stories of inflated
organ prices, if they can be trusted at all, are not representative of
what organ prices would be in a legal market.393 Consider that in a
black market there is a diminished supply of goods and additional
risks because of illegality. 394 Both of these factors increase the
market price of the goods. In a legal market, supply is increased,
and there are only ordinary risks associated with selling the
good.395 Both of these factors would push the price for organs
down.396 Current economic estimates of organ prices in a legal
market predict that they would be reasonable when compared with
the cost of the transplant procedure. 397
There are reports that the black market in human organs has
resulted in the exploitation of the poor, including many terrible and
389 Id. at 142-70.
390 Id. This thought experiment is supportive for both living and cadaveric
market systems. In the former example, the parent analogously places herself at
risk for her child and, in the latter example, the parent provides one final benefit
to her child. Id.
391 See Goyal et al., supra note 363, at 1589-92.
392 Kasserman, supra note 351, at 573-75.
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 Id.
396 Id. Scholars continue to consider that now "zero cost" organs may appear to
be the best possible consumption deal that the poor can have for organs. In
contrast to the current "zero cost" market, a traditional market will likely
increase supply, but add some cost to the organs and, by extension, to the
transplantation procedure. A traditional market will also allow some form of
compensation. This is arguably better for poor donors than no compensation.
Additionally, a sufficient increased supply of legal organs should eradicate the
black market in organs and the associated ills. See id.
391 See id
SPRING 2003]
dishonest acts, and disease transmission.398 It is important to note
that many of these ills, like black market pricing, should not be
extrapolated on to what would occur in a legal regulated market.399
To illustrate this point, consider the United States during
prohibition or during the period in which abortion was generally
illegal.40 0 There was certainly a time when dealing with alcohol
40 1
or having an abortion 40 2 was a dangerous prospect. Today,
however, both exist under regulated systems. 4°3 There are some
arguably negative consequences that have resulted from each
practice.40 4 Discussion continues on many levels debating the
merits of each, but the general environment for drinking and
medical abortions is much safer than it was during their periods of
405prohibition. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to
imagine the current relative safety we enjoy under our legal system
by citing examples based on practices during a period of
prohibition.40 6 Likewise, it is inappropriate to use the evils
398 See Goyal et al., supra note 363, at 1589-92. Disease transmission
specifically is a concern that technology is alleviating through better screening
methods. The compensated market in blood and plasma had early problems
with disease transmission that are now virtually eliminated through improved
testing procedures that are available. Crespi, supra note 360, at 18-24.
399 Kasserman, supra note 351, at 568-80.
400 Both of these examples are particularly fitting because they both involve
personal autonomy and state control. In the case of abortion, there is also a
strong medical technology tie, as well as a substantive due process element, that
has also been considered with property rights in organs.
401 Most people are familiar with Al Capone and the terrors that spawned during
prohibition in the 1920's, including the St. Valentine's Day Massacre. Court
TV, Crime Library: St. Valentine's Day, at
http://www.crimelibrary.com/gangsters-outlaws/mobbosses/capone/day_8.htm
l?sect-15 (last visited Mar. 22, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
Law & Technology).
402 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973) (describing the horrors of illegal
abortions).
403 Leonard Birdsong, Drug Decriminalization and Felony Disenfranchisement
the New Civil Rights Causes, 2 BARRY L. REV. 73, 79 (2001). In fact,
prohibition has been called our "dismal failed national experiment ... " Id.
404 Id. at 79-80.
405 id.
406 It is also arguable that prohibition itself may be partially responsible for the
ills associated with black market activity. Id. at 79-81.
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apparent in a black market for organs as indicative of the problems
that may result from a legal market in organs.
Presumed consent is an often discussed market alternative
for organ procurement. 407 Presumed consent is essentially a
national policy, popular in Europe, that presumes that each person
consents to the donation of their organs unless they indicate
otherwise.408 In contrast, one could consider the current United
States system as one of presumed non-consent. 40 9 As discussed
above, our country has traditionally believed that a person is not an
organ donor unless she explicitly states as much.410
The difficulty many people have with presumed consent is
a moral one.41' Presumed consent implies a state or societal claim
over the body of every person in the jurisdiction.412 Many scholars
find this implication difficult to deal with ethically.41 3 As this
article has discussed above, some courts have found this concept to
be a violation of traditional notions of due process.4 14 If presumed
consent is rejected as a method to increase organ donation in the
United States, some form of market may be considered to perform
the same function.4t 5
C. Market Possibilities
Markets have been described as "an obvious and
straightforward approach to solving the organ or any other
,,416shortage.' Many people greatly underestimate the variety of
forms a market in human organs could take and still be able to
407 See Morris, supra note 113, at 1135-39.
408 Id.
4 91 Id. at 1128-35.
4 10 id
411 See id. at 1139-47.
4 12 id.
413 See Morris, supra note 113, at 1139-47.
414 Id see also supra notes 165-208.
415 See Kasserman, supra note 351, at 568-72.
416 Id. at 568.
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increase the organ supply.417 The first important choice that could
be made is between some form of living donor market and
cadaveric donor market. 4 18 Generally speaking, people are more
comfortable with a cadaveric market in organs because it removes
the possibility of people selling an organ they may need later or the
disability that might result from such a sale. 4 19 The cadaveric
market is often called a futures market in organs because there may
be some payment made to the person during life or at death for
organs that will not be recovered until death.42 °
A second important variable in the organ market is to
separate markets for procurement from markets for distribution.
A market for distribution where donees bid on organs to be
distributed in an auction system is bothersome to many people
because of the possibility that rich donees would receive a
disproportionate share of organs. 4 22 It seems less worrisome to
imagine hospitals, insurance companies, or OPOs bidding in a
well-regulated or price-fixed system for organs.423 The
Pennsylvania system discussed above is a price-fixed cadaveric
organ procurement market where the state is the only allowed
424bidder.  This type of market may be more desirable because the
price paid on the procurement end of the market would attract
more donors, while the distribution end of the market could be
controlled so that organs would be distributed under an equitable
system.4
25
A third important market consideration would be to whom,
426
when, and in what form payment would be made for the organ.
The idea of giving a donor a check, cashable at the nearest liquor
417 Id. at 568-80. When mentioning a market in organs, many people
immediately imagine some eBay-like auction where living people sell kidneys
and lungs to the highest bidder. In fact, there are many more possibilities. Id.
418 See id.
419 See id.
420 See id.
421 See id. at 575-77.
422 See id.
423 Id
424 HARRIS I, supra note 3, at 227.
425 See Kasserman, supra note 351, at 575-77.
426 Id. at 568-80.
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store, is terrifying to most people, and rightfully SO. 4 2 7 Scholars
have considered many alternatives to a cash-up-front method that
are more palatable. 4 28 The alternatives include discounted
insurance premiums, estate tax credits, payments to charities or
religious groups, lost wage recovery, payments of funeral
expenses, and associated family expenses directly related to the
donation. 429 A related idea implicit in the above discussion is who
430pays for organs.. It is possible to include the cost of the organ in
the standard hospital bill, so that the donee is not directly
responsible for the payment.43' Insurance premium discounts and
estate tax relief do not cause direct cost; they are merely income
not received by the purchasing organization.
4 32
Finally, a market could help overcome what has been
referred to as the "tyranny of the gift. 433 This is guilt that some
transplant recipients feel after receiving this gift that is inherently
one-sided.434 The recipient is given a priceless second chance at
life, and often wants to be able to give something back to the donor
or the donor's family.435 In some cases, the recipient may not feel
they can ever fully continue their life independently because they
feel that they are in a debt relationship that cannot be overcome.
436
A market may begin to allow for some sense of repayment
between the donor and recipient.437 Valuable consideration could
help overcome the tyranny of the gift.
438
427 See id.
428 See id.
429 See id.
430 See id.
431 See id.
432 See id.
433 RENEE C. Fox & JUDITY P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 39-42 (1992).
434 Id.
435 Id.
436 Id.
437 See id. at 64-72.
438 See id.
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V. Conclusion
Considering the above, there can and should be an effective
market option that is ethically palatable.439 Legal and medical
scholars do not find the current system and resulting deaths
ethically acceptable.44 °
Any robust instantiation of an organ market would require
amending the prohibition against valuable consideration in NOTA.
Since amending NOTA is probably not a politically viable option,
a first step toward an acceptable organ market could be a "practical
market" or specifically a practical compensation system. This
could be governmental or insurance company reimbursement for
cadaveric organs following the Pennsylvania model. This could
allow families of donors to be reimbursed for expenses related to
organ donation including meals and funeral expenses.
Compensation in any form would provide an incentive that does
not exist in the current altruistic system. Ideally, this incentive
would lead to greater donations. By limiting this proposed
"practical market" to cadaveric donors the market would bypass
health concerns about the consequences of living donations.
One could argue that property rights in body parts are being
established, that organs have value, and that a market for these
organs does exist in the United States.44 1 The altruistic market is a
procurement side market with the United States government as the
only allowable bidder.442 The bidder has set the price in the legal
4" HARRIS 1, supra note 3, at 231-33. There are four central tenets of modem
biomedical ethics. First is autonomy defined as respect for the individual to
pursue his own needs, interests, desires, and independence. Second is
beneficence or the result of actually doing good for patients. Third is
nonmalfeasance, which is the concept that healthcare providers should also not
harm patients in their efforts to do good. Finally there is justice, which is the
fair distribution of benefits and burdens of a policy or treatment. Scholars
disagree about whether or not an organ market can be implemented with proper
respect for and balancing of each concept. JAMES R. RODRIGUE,
BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSPLANTATION 44 (Kluwer
Academic/Plenum Publishers New York) (2001).
440 "[W]hat has been done thus far has arguably been worse than doing nothing."
Harris I, supra note 3, at 227.
441 Id. at 213-31.
442 Kasserman, supra note 351, at 568-80.
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market to zero. 4 3 This is the lowest possible monetary incentive
to compensate suppliers in the current market.444 The unregulated
black market thrives in the background while the legal, price fixed,
and under-priced market fails to provide for legitimate market
needs, resulting in the deaths of thousands and the suffering of tens
of thousands." 5
Advancing medical technology has created value in human
organs and tissues.446 The struggle for a market in human organs
is one facet of individuals' claiming property rights in their own
bodies.447 Individuals are attempting to claim these rights in the
face of old common law (e.g. Coke) and new statutory resistance
(e.g., NOTA, UAGA).448 Allowing individual autonomy to
flourish with some form of compensated organ market holds great
promise to prevent people from suffering and dying while waiting
for organs and political action.
449
443 id.
444 id.
44 Id.
445 id446 See id.
447 See SCOTT, supra note 2, at 181-84.
448 See id. at 179-97.
"9 Harris I, supra note 3, at 231-33. See generally Crespi, supra note 360
(discussing several types of organ markets).
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